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framing of their pleadings and issues and determines no objection not
expressly raised by one of them. Moreover, the judicial refusal to recog-
nize it [the stipulation] would often permit unseemly breaches of faith
by counsel who have signed the admission.14
Courts which have given effect to written waivers have been
criticized as according a "curing" effect to a stipulation. If such evi-
dence would not have been admitted without a stipulation, could
the presence of a stipulation cure these defects? The Illinois court
answered no:
If such tests are as unpredictable and misleading as the courts are so
certain they are, then their reliability and usefulness to the court and
jury upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence remains the
same, regardless if they are admitted by stipulation or not.15
Only after thoroughly examining the circumstances of a waiver
should a court pass upon the admissibility of lie-detector evidence
under a prior written stipulation. If the qualifications as set out
by the Arizona court are met, 6 it is submitted that courts should give
effect to the agreement.
Jerry P. Rhoads
LANDLORD AND TE r-LiABnrrY OF A LANDLORD TO A Tioim PEnsON
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIs TENANT.- Appellants own land which is
surrounded on three sides by mountain property owned by the ap-
pellee. The appellee leased some of its land to be mined for coal
and the lessee adopted the method of strip mining. After the cessation
of the operations, the appellee did not restore the land to prevent
erosion along natural watercourses. As a result, its branches began to
be obstructed with rock, silt, and coal emanating from the strip mines
on the higher property. Later, heavy rains expedited this drainage
and sent further amounts of debris into these watercourses. At a point
where the streams unite on the land of the appellants, the streams
overflowed. The water washed over a portion of the appellants' land,
burying it under a thick cover of rock, dirt, and coal. It is alleged
that the appellee failed to exercise ordinary care and was guilty of
wanton, reckless, and wilful conduct. Punitive as well as compen-
satory damages were demanded. It was the position of the appellee
that the wrongful acts complained of were committed by its lessee
for which it was not liable. The trial court dismissed appellants'
14 Id. at 592.
15 People v. Zazzetta, 27 IM. 2d 302, -, 189 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1963).
16 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, -, 371 P. 2d 894, 900 (1962).
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complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim. Held: Be-
versed. The court stated:
Here we have a potentially harmful activity, conducted on the owner's
land for his profit. In addition, the appellee had assumed, or had the
right to assume control of its land, and would be in the position of a
landowner continuing to maintain a nuisance created by his lessee.
Green v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 377 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1964).
The case at hand is the first in Kentucky to raise this precise ques-
tion at the appellate level. Undoubtedly, the appellant had a valid
complaint against someone in this instance.' The question is, against
whom? It appears the result was proper, but it is submitted that the
decision was rested upon two grounds, with the majority of weight
resting on the wrong ground.
As a general rule, the liability for injury to persons outside the
demised premises caused by the condition or use of the premises, is
prima facie a liability of the tenant and not the landlord if the premises
were under the full control of the tenant and were in good condition
when leased.2 This view is accepted widely, and with little variance,
by both case law and treatises.3 An example, very nearly in point is
O'Leary v. Herbert,4 where the court held:
Lessors of mining property out of possession and control thereof were
not liable for the negligence of a lessee in possession of property with
reference to water rights of adjoining landowners.
But, there are exceptions to this general rule which confer liability
on the landlord. The landlord is generally held liable: (1) When he
fails to disclose concealed dangerous conditions known by him at
the time of transfer;5 (2) when he knowingly allows the lessee to
conduct necessarily dangerous activities on the premises as con-
templated by the lease?0 (3) when he leases for a purpose involving
the admission of the public;7 (4) when he retains control of a part
of the premises;8 (5) when he contracts to repair defective premises
or in fact attempts to do so;9 (6) when he permits or authorizes
1 Annot., 54 A..LR. 358 (1927) (one through whose fault a stream becomes
obstructed by debris or waste material is liable for the damage caused thereby).
2 32 Am. Jur. Landlord & Tenant § 755 (1941).
3 Johnson v. Kum, 95 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1938); Clary v. Hayes 800 Ky.
853, 190 S.W.2d 657 (1945); Annot, 53 A.L.R. 327 (1924); Restatement (Sec-
ond), Torts § 379A (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960); Prosser, Torts § 80 (2d ed. 1953);
25 Tex L. Rev. 427 (1947).
45 Cal. 2d 416, 55 P. 2d 834 (1936).







another person to go thereon and create a nuisance. 10
Of these exceptions, the second is the one on which the Court
in the principal case seemingly has hung its decision. Stated more
exactly the exception as recorded in the Restatement" reads:
The lessor knows or has reason to know that they (the lessee's activities)
will necessarily involve an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons
outside of the land, or that special precautions necessary to safety will
not be taken.
It can be seen, however, that this exception should not be applied,
since it is applicable only when there is risk of physical harm to
persons, which is not the case in the principal decision. It might be
argued that the decision is merely an extension of an exception to
lessors liability, and perhaps should be interpreted that way in any
event. But, to do so would involve a major extension of the absolute
liability doctrine as derived by the American courts from the English
decision of Rylands v. Fletcher.12 The doctrine, as it has developed,
is applied to a dangerous thing or activity through an unnatural use
of the land, necessarily involving a high degree of risk to those in
the vicinity.' 3 The extension would be brought about due to the
presence of the phrase-"or has reason to know"-which is negligence
language. By deleting this phrase, we would have remaining the
phrase-"the lessor knows"--which is willful conduct language, and
when combined with an activity necessarily involving an unreasonable
risk, results in the absolute liability doctrine as applied in the United
States. Thus, the exception, with both phrases intact, extended to
include harm to land would add negligent conduct to the absolute
liability doctrine.
Even if this were not the case, the exception would nevertheless
be inapplicable, due to the fact that strip mining does not neces-
sarily involve an unreasonable risk of harm. In addition, it is open
to interpretation, as to whether the court actually classifies strip
mining as necessarily involving an unreasonable risk. It terms the
activity as "potentially harmful" and "damage could be reasonably
anticipated," but never states specifically that strip mining is an
unreasonable risk per se. However, to so classify, or indeed, to even
consider strip mining as potentially harmful to persons outside the
land, seems to be beyond the bounds of reason. The lack of validity
of such reasoning is perhaps most clearly shown by the widespread
10 Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landowner, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 260 (1927).
" Restatement (Second), Torts § 379a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
12L.Rs 1 Ex. 265 (1866), af'd, L.R. 3 .L. 330 (1868).
'3 Frosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (1941).
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use of the method and the complete re-vitalization of land thus used
when proper reclamation processes are adopted.
It is submitted, that the court has in actuality, applied the much
criticized and widely rejected doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher'4-
extending Rylands to impose vicarious liability on a non-acting third
party lessor. The elements of the case are an unnatural use of land,
through an activity which could, but not necessarily, create a risk
of danger to surrounding landowners. These are the requisites for
finding liability under Rylands v. Fletcher.5
It, therefore, appears that the court in this decision, bypassed
a settled doctrine of when lessors are to be held liable by means of
illogical reasoning. Since the nuisance was not a necessary conse-
quence of the expected activity, and since it could have been con-
ducted without such interference with the interests of others, the tenant
alone should be held liable.' 6
The decision, however, can be justified by the court's alternate
contention, namely, that the landowner continued to maintain the
nuisance created by his lessee. This, of course, was a wrong com-
mitted directly by the owner, on which the recovery can be based.17
The possibility that this decision might open the door to further
litigation to hold lessors liable for the acts of the lessee who engages
in strip mining, might be greater than envisioned. This possibility
exists, despite the court's attempt to negate it when they declared
that they did not endeavor to make a general ruling, only one in re-
gard to the facts at hand. They were prompted toward this decision,
probably no little amount, by the fact that the lessor also was a coal
mining company. But, in view of the passage of President Johnson's
Appalachia-aid program, out of which $36.5 million is going to
reclaim millions of acres of land that have been abandoned after
being gouged and torn by strip mining,'8 it is almost certain that
more notoriety will be directed toward strip mining activities. It is,
therefore, just as conceivable that other courts will grasp this decision
in an effort to exert greater pressure toward correcting this situation.
Correction of the problem is desirable, but not at the expense of,
more often than not, an innocent landowner who has no idea that a
lessee is going to create potential harm to adjoining landowners. A
landowner often wouldn't realize that the risk was being created
14 Ibid.
1G Ibid.
10 Prosser, Torts § 63 (3d ed. 1964).
17 SVift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 186 A. 629 (1936).
' 8 Time, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 15.
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if he saw it. The guilty party is the acting tenant, who is fully cogni-
zant of his acts and their consequences, and should be held to ac-
count for them accordingly.
Roger M. Oliver
ADAmSTRATIvE LAw-ZoNNG-APPEAL FRom Zornwc BoARD DECISioNs.
-Petition to the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission asking a zone change from residential to business for a
shopping center denied as contra the master zoning plan. At the
hearing evidence was introduced to show: other commercial develop-
ments in the area, no objection from residents of the area, no detri-
ment would accrue to the surrounding area, and a community ad-
vantage would result.
Applicant appealed to Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to KRS
100.057(2), which provides: ". . . Hearings in the Circuit Court shall
be de novo. .. ." The circuit court upheld the commission and found
that the decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and, in hear-
ing the evidence, that there was no tenable basis for re-classifying
the property.
Applicant appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in
placing the burden of proof on him. Held: Afinned. The trial court
merely set the order of introduction of proof as authorized by CR
48.02(3), and did not place the burden on applicant. American Beauty
Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission, 379 S.W. 2d 450 (Ky. 1964). This holding has little
significance, but the court did not stop there. The court went on to
consider the constitutionality of KRS 100.057(2) and purported to
hold the statute unconstitutional because of the provision for a de
novo hearing in circuit court. The court found that the section violated
the Kentucky Constitution, Sec. 27.1 The court stated:
2
In order that the independence of the three distinct departments of
government be preserved, it is a fundamental principle that the legis-
lature cannot invade the province of the judiciary . . . nor may it im-
pose on the judiciary nonjudiciary duties.
The court reasoned that the legislature, in providing for a de novo
hearing, attempted to confer upon the judiciary the identical duties
1 "The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall
be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a
separate body of magistracy, to-wit: those which are legislative, to one; those
which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another."
2 379 S.W.2d 450 at 453.
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